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By distinguishing between discretionary and non-discretionary fiscal policy, this paper
analyses the stability of fiscal rules for EMU countries before and after the Maastricht
Treaty. Using both Instrumental Variables and GMM techniques, it turns out that
discretionary fiscal policy has remained procyclical after 1992. This result contradicts
the previous findings of Galı ´ and Perotti. It also appears that fiscal rules differ between
large and small countries; large countries follow a procyclical discretionary policy.
Furthermore, the paper shows that discretionary fiscal policy exhibits different behav-
iour when facing supply or demand constraints. A procyclical discretionary policy
is followed mainly during upswings, when supply constraints are prevalent. Finally,
there is no support for the presence of a ‘fatigue effect’ in fiscal discipline.
JEL classifications: E63, H11, H61.
1. Introduction
Fiscal arrangements, which have been settled during the European integration
process, undoubtedly constitute the most criticized part of the European
Monetary Union (EMU). Even if they aim at increasing real convergence among
member countries, they are occasionally perceived among national politicians and
European citizens as an unacceptable dictate from authorities in Brussels that
removed the possibility of fiscal expansion in the face of recessions. In other
words, by imposing fiscal rules in the Maastricht Treaty or the Stability and
Growth Pact, fiscal policy would have lost its counter-cyclical role and thus,
the stabilizing effect it used to play in the past.
Empirical studies that have tried to find support for the changing cyclical behav-
iour of fiscal policy during the European integration process have failed to come
to a clear-cut corroboration, and some even endorsed the fiscal manoeuvring
room introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact
(see Wyplosz, 2006, for a survey). In this respect, the paper by Galı ´ and Perotti
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  Oxford Economic Papers Advance Access published June 28, 2009(2003) (GP hereafter) constitutes a widely cited example. GP systematically distin-
guished between discretionary and non-discretionary fiscal policy in their
analysis. In the first case, the variable of interest is the structural deficit, corrected
for cyclical fluctuations. Any change in the public deficit indicates discretionary
policy. The non-discretionary part of the fiscal deficit then encompasses the auto-
matic stabilizing effects due to business cycle fluctuations. For example, the public
deficit tends to be automatically reduced during upward phases of the cycle
because of an increase in fiscal income.
GP investigated the stability of both components of fiscal policy before and
after the signature of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 through the estimation of
a fiscal-rule equation for the period 1980–2002. As might be expected from
the automatic stabilizer effects, non-discretionary fiscal policy clearly showed a
counter-cyclical behaviour in the pre-Maastricht period, which increased even
after the Maastricht Treaty. Concerning the discretionary part, GP found that
fiscal policy was procyclical in the pre-Maastricht period, but in the post-
Maastricht period this changed to counter-cyclical behaviour. GP therefore con-
cluded that the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact supported
the implementation of fiscal policy in the constituted EMU, instead of being
a restraint.
This presence of a significant break in 1992, as well as the procyclical pattern
of discretionary fiscal policy prior to Maastricht, though acyclical thereafter, has
been confirmed by Wyplosz (2006, Table 2) using more recent data and similar
estimation procedures. Von Hagen (2006, Table 6) found that discretionary policy
has remained procyclical after Maastricht, but this conclusion is subject to caution
as it is based on pooled OLS estimation, which may be biased, as we will argue
below (in line with GP).
1 Fata ´s and Mihov (2003a) stressed that the Stability and
Growth Pact in its various guises has provided protection against the undesirable
consequences of policy discretion by introducing constraints on deficit policy.
They concluded that the Pact has indeed been successful in reducing deficit vola-
tility, in particular, for discretionary policy. However, they also observed ‘fatigue
in the process of fiscal adjustment. Once countries have moved into the safe
area below the 3% limit, the pressure to continue towards the goal of close to
balance or surplus is much weaker...’ (p.121). Finally, an interesting observation
by many authors is that elections had an impact on fiscal behaviour, consistent
with the notion of a political business cycle (De Haan et al., 2003; Annett, 2006;
Von Hagen, 2006; Hallerberg et al., 2007).
This paper extends the GP study to more recent years, since GP was based on
OECD Economic Outlook data covering only the period 1980–2002.
2 Extending
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1The same holds for the estimations by Fonseca Marinheiro (2005).
2Several studies have advocated the use of real-time data to judge the pro- or counter cyclicality of fiscal
policies, by using only information actually available to policymakers at the time they make their
decisions—e.g., Forni and Momigliano (2004) and Golinelli and Momigliano (2006). However, the
2o f2 7 fiscal and monetary integrationthe sample for the period 2002–4 provides additional information and removes the
problem of data revision, which affected the observations used by GP. Comparing
the results of the estimation for the periods 1980–2002 and 1980–2004, it turns out
that contrary to GP and Wyplosz (2006), discretionary fiscal policy is consistently
procyclical over the sample. Furthermore, fiscal policy has not become less procy-
clical after Maastricht; adding data for the last two years indicates even greater
procyclical behaviour of discretionary fiscal policy. Hence, the fiscal arrangements
induced by EMU have in no manner constituted an ease, but instead have provided
less room for effective discretionary fiscal policy. Contrary to GP, our conclusion
supports the uneasy feeling among various European politicians. Concerning non-
discretionary fiscal policy, the enlarged sample confirms the stabilizing role of
automatic stabilizers, which have played an increased role since 1992, as predicted
by economic theory (Wren-Lewis, 2000; Fata ´s and Mihov, 2003b).
In our analysis, we find also strong indications of country heterogeneity.
Following the literature, we distinguish between different fiscal polices for large
and small countries. We conclude that small countries have more acyclical discre-
tionary fiscal policies, as expected. The large countries exhibit a different behaviour,
as they tend to support a procyclical discretionary fiscal policy, without any
break in 1992. This small versus large country heterogeneity is not found in
the case of non-discretionary fiscal policy, which is counter-cyclical regardless of
the country and the sample considered.
To complement the analysis, we also separately investigate the reactions of dis-
cretionary and non-discretionary fiscal policy to supply and demand shocks. To
this aim, we use survey information on demand and supply constraints issued from
the European Commission’s Business and Consumer Survey, EU (2006). It turns
out that the procyclical bias of discretionary fiscal policy is most prevalent under
supply constraints, i.e., during the upswing, which is consistent with our earlier
findings. Such a result constitutes a striking stylized fact. In line with Kostoris
Padoa Schioppa (2006), we also expect a clear distinction between large and
small countries in fiscal policy behaviour. It turns out that large countries indeed
react strongly to supply constraints by increasing the discretionary deficit, and react
to demand constraints by decreasing the deficit. Small countries, on the other hand,
show no reaction to these constraints in their discretionary fiscal policy.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the GP methodology
and show that the results of the fiscal rules differ for an extended sample period.
Since we also observe the presence of country heterogeneity, we further investigate
the presence of heterogeneity by differentiating between large and small countries
in Section 3, and show that country heterogeneity indeed plays a role. Finally,
in Section 4 we investigate whether the observed differences in countries’ reactions
..........................................................................................................................................................................
availability of real time data is limited. Moreover, the objective of this paper is to evaluate actual fiscal
policy conducted by EMU governments, because eventually governments are judged on their ex-post
performance.
b. candelon, j. muysken, and r. vermeulen 3o f2 7can be explained by differences in demand and supply constraints; this turns
out to be the case to a limited extent. However, we generally find an asymmetric
reaction of discretionary fiscal policy to demand and supply constraints.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Have discretionary and non-discretionary fiscal policies
changed since Maastricht?
In line with GP, most researchers that have investigated the behaviour of fiscal
policy based their analysis on a fiscal rule. The simple link between a budget deficit
(dt) and the output gap (gapt) can be specified as follows:
dt ¼ c þ a1:gapt þ "t, ð1Þ
where "t is white noise. Nevertheless, this over-simplified fiscal rule suffers from
several specification and estimation problems. First, it does not take into account
the possible dynamics of the budget deficit. For instance, a country facing a huge
deficit and a high debt level has less room for a new expansionary fiscal shock
and will tend to be more restrictive for the coming fiscal exercise. As a consequence,
one might expect that the fiscal impulse at time t depends on the past public
deficit (dt 1) and the past stock of debt (bt 1). Second, there is a potential sim-
ultaneity bias between public deficit (dt) and the output gap (gapt). For this reason,
GP rightly rejected the use of a simple (pooled) OLS-estimator and applied an
IV-estimator. However, Arellano and Bover (1995) showed that a GMM estimator
based on orthogonal deviation might perform better than an IV-estimator in
the case of a dynamic panel model. Nevertheless, the relative properties of the IV
and GMM estimators remain debatable in the econometric literature,
3 and thus
we decide to report the results obtained by both methodologies.
We follow common practice by using a fixed-effects panel data analysis to
estimate a fiscal rule for a group of countries. Our model consists of the following
fiscal rule:
di,t ¼ ci þ a1:Et 1ðgapi,tÞþa2:di,t 1 þ a3:bi,t 1 þ ui,t, ð2Þ
where i refers to the country dimension and Et 1(gapi,t) is approximated by gapi,t.
When estimating the fiscal rule using a fixed effects Instrumental Variables (IV)
estimator, we follow GP and instrument gapi,t by the lagged output gap of the
country itself, gapi,t-1, and the lagged US output gap, gapUS,t-1. Following the ori-
ginal Arellano-Bover GMM methodology, we do not use lags of the exogenous
variables as instruments with GMM, but instead use lags of the dependent variable
in the instrument space (Harris and Matyas, 2004). Therefore, the instrument
..........................................................................................................................................................................
3Harris and Matyas (2004) compared the Arellano-Bover (1995) approach to different IV specifications,
showing that the respective properties of these estimators depend on several factors. In particular, they
showed by simulations that when the sample size is finite, GMM may be biased as it considers large
instrument matrices.
4o f2 7 fiscal and monetary integrationspace consists of up to two lags of the dependent variable, di,t-2 and di,t-3,
4 and in
line with GP we also add the lagged US output gap (gapUS,t-1). The adequacy of the
instruments is tested via the traditional Sargan test, which confirms our choice of
the instrument set. To obtain a robust standard error, the White period correction
is applied.
To investigate whether a changing behaviour in the fiscal policy occurred after
the Maastricht Treaty, the coefficients are allowed to take a different value in the
periods before and after the Treaty, i.e., in the periods 1980–91 and 1992–2004.
The choice of 1992 as a known break date is strongly motivated by economic facts,
namely the year of the signature of the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, considering
the break date as unknown and using traditional stability tests in the GMM frame-
work (Hall and Sen, 1999) would lead to huge confidence bounds, as the sample
is of finite size (21 observations). Unambiguously, the presence of a break in
1992 would not be rejected at the 95% confidence interval.
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2 :di,t 1 þ aBM
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AM refer to the value of the coefficient during the pre and post-
Maastricht periods, respectively. In the case of an unchanged behaviour of fiscal
policy after the Treaty, it should be noticed that aBM
1 ¼ aAM
1 can be tested via
a simple F-test. A comparison of the values of the coefficients aBM
1 and aAM
1
would indicate if the ease of the fiscal policy has improved or not. In the case
that the absolute value of a1 has increased, this indicates a stronger counter-cyclical
behaviour when a1<0 or a stronger procyclical behaviour when a1>0.
The proxy for fiscal policy is the budget deficit. As in GP, both the actual (dt)
and the structural budget deficit (d 
t ) are considered in our study. The variable d 
t
indicates the discretionary changes in fiscal policies due to the decision of fiscal
authorities, whereas the variable dc
t represents the non-discretionary fiscal policy
as it may be subject to changes that are not under the control of the fiscal
authorities. An example of this ‘automatic stabilizing’ effect is the reduction of
the budget deficit during upward movements of the business cycle.
6 As activity
is booming and the positive output gap increases, tax income automatically rises,
..........................................................................................................................................................................
4Due to the nature of the panel, small N and large T, it is not feasible to use the entire instrument space
composed of all lags of the dependent variable.
5A formal test is beyond the objective of the paper and is left for further research. Nevertheless, a quick
investigation considering recursive candidate break points indicates that the coefficients before and after
1992 are significantly different. Moreover, the t-statistics are maximal for a break in 1992.
6In line with the literature, we concentrate on the primary government deficit, i.e., excluding interest
payments on government debt. The motivation to do this is that the latter are neither discretionary nor
automatic stabilizers, whereas the discussion focuses on the interaction between discretionary policy and
automatic stabilizers.
b. candelon, j. muysken, and r. vermeulen 5o f2 7reducing the budget deficit without any action of fiscal authorities. To remove
business cycle movements and to have an adequate proxy of the discretionary
action of the fiscal authorities, the OECD has constructed data on a structural
public deficit.
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ð5Þ
A negative sign of a 
1 or ac
1 indicates a counter-cyclical policy, whereas a positive
sign points towards a procyclical policy.
8
We present the estimation results of the discretionary fiscal rule on the pre- and
post-Maastricht period for a set of 11 European countries in Tables 1 and 2,
respectively.
9 In Table 3, we report on the non-discretionary fiscal rule. Annual
data over the period 1980–2004 are extracted from OECD (2006). The output
gap (gapi,t) is defined as the relative deviation of the gross domestic product
from the potential output defined by the OECD.
10 As in GP, the pre-Maastricht
period corresponds to 1980–91, whereas we consider two different post-Maastricht
samples: the same as in GP, i.e. 1992–2002, and an extended sample running
from 1992 to 2004. We found that although the first sample period is identical
to that used in GP, our more recent data are somewhat different because of
the revision process; it takes more than one year before the OECD produces its
definitive data.
11 Furthermore, we have no reason to believe that the sales of
..........................................................................................................................................................................
7See the Appendix for data sources.
8Note that eq. (3) does not impose any restrictions on the coefficients of eqs (4) and (5).
9The countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain.
10A quick inspection of the data shows that OECD potential output is similar to a trend obtained by
applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter with standard l parameters (l=400 for yearly data).
11Even earlier data is subject to revisions in case the previous data turns out to be unreliable or
authorities change their statistical calculation methods. The former reason is most pronounced in the
revision of Greece’s debt and deficit, whereas the latter is present in the revision of GDP figures. These
revisions can be quite large, e.g. in the case of Greece, the debt/GDP ratio for 2001 is 32 percentage
points larger in OECD (2006) than in OECD (2002). Also, for Italy it is 12 percentage points higher,
whereas it is seven percentage points lower for Spain, both for 2001. That earlier data is also revised is
illustrated by the observation that the Netherlands’ debt/GDP ratio is 15 percentage points higher in
1982 in OECD (2006) than in OECD (2002). For most countries, revisions took place, although they are
different in magnitude.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































b. candelon, j. muysken, and r. vermeulen 9o f2 7Universal Mobile Telecommunications Systems (UMTS) licenses should have
played a role here.
12
As discussed above, we use two different estimations methods: IV with different
fixed effects before and after Maastricht, and GMM.
GP found a significant change in discretionary policy from ‘procyclical before
...[to] essentially acyclical after Maastricht’(Galı ´ and Perotti, 2003, p.550). The
comparable IV-estimates with fixed effects in Table 1 show no significant
change.
13 This indicates that the data revision had an impact on the estimation
of the fiscal rule. On the other hand, the more efficient GMM-estimation results
indicate a significant change, consistent with GP.
Comparing the results of Tables 1 and 2 also suggests that discretionary fiscal
policy has become more procyclical in recent years. That is, when we extend
the estimation period to 2004, Table 2 shows quite different results using both
estimation methods. For the GMM-estimates: the marked increase in the coefficient
a
 ,AM
1 after Maastricht signals that discretionary fiscal policy remains clearly
procyclical after Maastricht, and the coefficient becomes marginally significant.
Using the IV method, a
 ,AM
1 becomes significantly positive when extending the
estimation period. Both findings, using more recent data, contradict the results
found by GP.
As for the effect of past debt and deficits, all the results in Tables 1 and 2 show
that these have a significant impact with the expected signs. Similar to GP, a large
debt in the past has a mitigating impact on discretionary deficits, whereas a large
past deficit has a positive impact. There are no significant differences before and
after Maastricht.
In Candelon et al. (2008) IV-estimates were compared with various restrictions
on the fixed-effect coefficients.
14 We found a marked decrease of the estimated
value of a
 ,AM
1 when we included a fixed country effect (comparing the Pooled IV
with the Fixed Effect IV estimation). Next, when we allowed for the fixed effect to
be different before and after Maastricht, the estimated value of a
 ,AM
1 increased
again. This suggests that countries have reacted differently to a gap in their discre-
tionary policy after the Treaty, even when controlling for the impact of past debt
and deficits.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
12Koen and van den Noord (2005) discussed how these sales are reflected in a ‘one-off’ improvement in
the general government financial balance, equal to the total amount of the disposal and recorded at the
time the license is allocated. In 2000, UMTS revenues accounted for 1.08% of GDP in the Euro Area,
with 2.5% of GDP in Germany, 1.2% of GDP in Italy, and 0.7% of GDP in the Netherlands. We checked
whether a dummy variable for 2000 had a significant impact on the results. It turned out that this was
not the case for the discretionary deficit (although it was the case for the non-discretionary one).
13Whereas we find for a1=0.221 (0.052) and 0.096 (0.076) before and after Maastricht, respectively,
with a p-value of 0.178—cf Table 1 above, GP found a1=0.17 (0.05) and  0.08 (0.08), respectively, with
a p-value of 0.01—cf their Table 3.
14Dummy variables are not included; as in Arellano and Bover (1995) variables are expressed in orthog-
onal deviations.
10 of 27 fiscal and monetary integrationThe finding of country heterogeneity is widely observed in the more recent
literature, e.g., De Haan et al. (2003), Von Hagen (2003), Annett (2006), and
Hallerberg et al. (2007). In the context of our panel analysis, a typical way to
deal with this country heterogeneity consists of introducing variables capturing
relevant political factors influencing the budgetary process. Following Annett
(2006), we therefore include in the panel analysis three political variables: a
dummy variable for the election year, a dummy variable for commitment or
mixed forms of fiscal governance (when using fiscal contracts and/or numerical
targets), and a dummy variable for delegation (the extent to which the fiscal
authority is under political pressure). It turns out that the delegation dummy
does not provide extra information in our data set relative to the distinction
before and after Maastricht, and might also lead to a multicollinearity problem.
Therefore, we decide not use that variable in our analysis. As reported in Candelon
et al. (2008), the commitment dummy does not have a significant influence. On
the contrary, the election dummy turns out to be significant and we therefore
include it in our estimation results. As the last two columns of both Tables 1
and 2 show, elections have a positive impact on the budget deficit before
Maastricht, as might be expected from the political business cycle theory.
However, the impact is absent in the period after Maastricht. Surprisingly, the
inclusion of the political variables in our analysis does not modify our previous
results. We therefore explore country heterogeneity in more detail in Section 3
below.
From Table 3, one sees that the results for non-discretionary fiscal policy are
quite clear. Whatever the estimation method, a significant increase in the counter-
cyclical behaviour of this type of fiscal policy after Maastricht is found. Since
similar results are found when we estimate for the period until 2002, we do not
present these results separately. This confirms the finding of GP that automatic
stabilizers took a more important role after the fiscal arrangements induced by
the EMU. It is also interesting to observe that neither country specific effects
nor election dummies had a large impact. This is consistent with the interpretation
of non-discretionary policy as truly representing automatic stabilizers.
Finally, we have also reproduced all estimations presented in Tables 2 and 3
for the period 1980–2006, using the most recent data, which will certainly be
revised for the years 2005–6 (for that reason, they are not presented separately).
The new estimations show the same tendencies as reported above for the discre-
tionary deficit. For the non-discretionary deficit, all coefficients are almost identical
to the results reported in Table 3.
While the findings on non-discretionary policy are quite robust and consistent
with prior notions, the findings on discretionary policy are more differentiated,
both with respect to the estimation period and with respect to the restrictions
imposed. However, two general observations can be made. First, a changing behav-
iour of the discretionary fiscal policy with respect to the output gap before and
after Maastricht is rejected. That is, contrary to the findings of GP we find that
discretionary fiscal policy has remained procyclical. Moreover, we have strong
b. candelon, j. muysken, and r. vermeulen 11 of 27indications that discretionary fiscal policy has become more procyclical in recent
years. A second observation is that we have strong evidence that countries reacted
differently to the Maastricht Treaty in the implementation of their fiscal policy,
even after controlling for past debts, deficits, and the political business cycle.
3. Have discretionary and non-discretionary fiscal policies
changed since Maastricht? A large vs small country
dimension
We have argued above that among the 11 European countries being considered,
some countries exhibit heterogeneous behaviour. This might imply that our panel
analysis leads to an average of country-specific fiscal rules that have little
in common. To investigate this possibility, we estimate the fiscal rule for each
individual country.
15 To keep the endogeneity bias under control, we use the
IV-method with dummies before and after Maastricht to estimate the individual
equations.
Table 4 summarizes the results of the estimation of these individual fiscal rules
for the period 1980–2004. It turns out that the output gap only has a significant
effect on discretionary policy after Maastricht for five countries: France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, and Portugal, which all have consistently procyclical behaviour.
Austria, Belgium, and Finland show a counter-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy,
although the impact of the output gap does not differ significantly from zero.
16
The non-discretionary fiscal policy exhibits a homogenous picture for all coun-
tries; it is significantly counter-cyclical, as can be seen from Table 4. This result
again stresses the importance of automatic stabilizers in the fiscal stabilization
policy and corroborates our conclusion from Section 2. However, from Table 4
one also sees that for none of the countries is the impact of the output gap on
the non-discretionary deficit significantly different before and after the Maastricht
treaty (except Finland and Portugal). This finding is inconsistent with the IV
estimates reported in Table 3 above.
A closer look at the data shows that for both Finland and Portugal the output gap
behaves in an opposite way in comparison to other European countries. In the
case of Finland, Braconier and Holden (1999) showed that the crisis affecting
Scandinavian countries in the early 1990s led to exceptionally fast growth of the
public sector expenditures as a share of GDP. For Portugal, Pina (2007) stressed
..........................................................................................................................................................................
15Note that estimation of the fiscal rule for individual countries leads to a small sample bias, i.e., 24
observations for the whole sample. Nevertheless, it gives an indication of the implementation of the
fiscal rule at the country level. Following GP, we do not distinguish between before and after Maastricht
for the coefficients of lagged debt and deficit in individual countries, in order to limit the number of
parameters to be estimated. For that reason, we also ignore election dummies here.
16Unpublished results show that the discretionary fiscal policy is more procyclical for most countries
when including the years 2003 and 2004 in the post-Maastricht sample, supporting our conclusion from
Section 2 of a stronger destabilizing role of the discretionary fiscal policy.
12 of 27 fiscal and monetary integrationthat, contrary to most European countries, primary spending has been strongly
procyclical because of the fast growing activity in the 1990s. Such a catch up process
has constituted an obstacle to fiscal consolidation ex-post. Finally, with respect to
Greece, data revision did lead to some quite serious changes to correct for incorrect
information that Greece presented when entering the EMU. We therefore further
ignore Finland, Greece, and Portugal in our analysis.
In panel A of Table 5, we show how excluding these three outliers from
the estimation results affects the estimation results for the EMU-11. The GMM
results are quite stable to the exclusion of outliers. However, the post-Maastricht
IV-estimates do change.























Austria 0.042  0.172  0.428***  0.487***
(0.183) (0.324) 0.552 (0.080) (0.094) 0.305
Belgium 0.356  0.482  0.617***  0.754***
(0.251) (0.694) 0.253 (0.066) (0.110) 0.233
Finland 0.162  0.282  0.417***  0.620***
(0.362) (0.206) 0.321 (0.096) (0.092) 0.001
France 0.175 0.484*  0.408***  0.456***
(0.123) (0.245) 0.291 (0.031) (0.032) 0.153
Germany 0.450*** 0.474**  0.517***  0.781***
(0.103) (0.207) 0.918 (0.104) (0.190) 0.142
Greece 0.088 1.173***  0.345***  0.352***
(0.377) (0.352) 0.059 (0.043) (0.036) 0.853
Ireland 0.748** 0.669  0.450***  0.346***
(0.341) (0.452) 0.800 (0.041) (0.033) 0.042
Italy 0.373* 0.567**  0.428***  0.483***
(0.207) (0.256) 0.556 (0.059) (0.069) 0.349
Netherlands 0.309 0.212  0.484***  0.470***
(0.179) (0.252) 0.781 (0.045) (0.046) 0.806
Portugal 0.371*** 0.319**  0.309***  0.427***
(0.075) (0.148) 0.739 (0.017) (0.029) 0.000
Spain 0.097 0.017  0.460***  0.482***
(0.117) (0.215) 0.762 (0.102) (0.079) 0.648
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1 . The output gap is instrumented in the IV estimator by including the one-year lagged US
output gap.
b. candelon, j. muysken, and r. vermeulen 13 of 27The procyclical behaviour of France, Germany, and Italy, and the insignificant,
albeit sometimes counter-cyclical behaviour, of Austria, Belgium, Ireland, and the
Netherlands, indicate the direction of a more systematic investigation of country
heterogeneity in discretionary policy. Various studies have pointed out the
possibility that small countries will stick much closer to the rules of the Stability
and Growth Pact than large countries, e.g., De Haan et al. (2003), Von Hagen
(2003), and Annett (2006); see Buti and Pench (2004) and Kostoris Padoa
Schioppa (2006) for a survey. This warrants taking the large countries in the
EU from our sample as a group (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) whose behav-
iour is compared to the small countries (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, and the
Netherlands). Moreover, employing both the GMM estimator and the fixed
effect IV estimator enables us to check the robustness of the estimations and
allows for heterogeneity in the explanatory variables before and after Maastricht.
Observe from panel B in Table 5 that the large countries had a significant
procyclical discretionary fiscal policy before Maastricht, which became more sig-
nificantly procyclical thereafter, whereas the small countries had a significant pro-
cyclical policy before Maastricht, but acyclical thereafter. This is consistent with
the notion that small countries will stick closer to the MT-rules, but it does not
explain why the large countries should follow a procyclical policy.
An interesting explanation of the latter phenomenon was provided by Kostoris
Padoa Schioppa (2006), who emphasized that it is important to distinguish
between demand and supply shocks to understand this phenomenon. We further
analyse that view in the next section.
Table 5 Country heterogeneity (output gap EMU-11, 1980–2004)
GMM
.....................................................................




















Panel A: EMU-11 and outliers with election dummies
EMU-11 0.227*** 0.130* 0.219*** 0.154**
(0.026) (0.070) 0.100 0.264 (0.050) (0.063) 0.424
EMU-11 (excl. FIN/
GRC/PRT)
0.210*** 0.159** 0.254*** 0.303***
(0.023) (0.077) 0.436 0.462 (0.054) (0.094) 0.648
Panel B: Large vs small countries with election dummies
DEU/ESP/FRA/
ITA
0.186*** 0.280*** 0.253*** 0.414***
(0.059) (0.090) 0.179 0.273 (0.071) (0.122) 0.259
AUT/BEL/IRE/
NLD
0.198*** 0.095 0.260*** 0.227
(0.067) (0.060) 0.214 0.143 (0.091) (0.143) 0.844
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See also the note to Table 1. For the GMM specification AUT/BEL/IRE/NLD, the lagged US gap
is excluded from the instrument space.
14 of 27 fiscal and monetary integration4. Have discretionary and non-discretionary fiscal policies
changed since Maastricht? Decomposing supply and
demand constraints
In search of a different impact of the output gap on the deficit for various countries,
we look at the different components of the output gap. Business cycle fluctuations
can either take their origins in constraints affecting the supply or the demand side.
In our view, an asymmetric pattern of fiscal policy can be expected in both
types of constraints. For instance, Calmfors et al. (2003, p.50) stated that, in the
short run ‘there is no reason...to believe that the automatic stabilisers give
an optimal degree of stabilisation...[On the contrary] if there are permanent
supply shocks, the automatic stabilisers tend to prolong the adjustment process
and cause budget effects that must ultimately be eliminated through discretionary
action’. See also Beetsma and Jensen (2004), who emphasized that the effectiveness
of a common fiscal policy rule for several countries with imperfectly correlated
supply shocks depends on the extent to which products are close substitutes.
A different argument was brought forward by Kostoris Padoa Schioppa (2006),
who, in line with Uhlig (2003), emphasized that demand shocks affect inflation
indirectly through the output gap, while supply shocks affect inflation directly.
This implies that the European Central Bank will react directly to supply shocks
(in particular occurring in large countries) and indirectly to demand shocks. Since
the EMU countries will take the reaction by the ECB into account when deciding
on fiscal policy, demand and supply shocks will have an asymmetric impact,
in particular in large countries.
The demand and supply indicators are constructed from disaggregated data
of the European Commission’s Business and Consumer Survey, EU (2006).
17 We
focus on Question 8 in the Industry/Business Climate Indicator (BCI) part, which
asks companies to record the most important factor limiting their production.
There are six possible answers (financial, demand, labour, equipment, other, or
none), which are reported in the dataset by the percentage of total firms selecting
this choice. We identify the answers ‘demand’ and ‘financial’ with demand con-
straints and ‘labour’ and ‘equipment’ with supply constraints.
18 Hence, it is pos-
sible to construct two indicators by simply adding up the shares of the firms
answering ‘demand’ and ‘financial’ to define the demand constraint (Dt) and simi-
larly, for the shares answering ‘labour’ and ‘equipment’ for the supply constraint
(St). The shares answering ‘none’ and ‘other’ form the last category, ‘no constraint’.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
17Inflation is an alternative proxy to indicate supply pressures. However, it is not clear whether only
supply shocks are measured, since demand shocks affect inflation indirectly (Kostoris Padoa Schioppa,
2006).
18The inclusion of financial constraints under demand constraints follows from the notion that credit
rationing constrains demand (Van der Ploeg, 2005). However, including financial constraints under the
category ‘other constraints’ does not affect our results since only a small proportion of firms are
involved.
b. candelon, j. muysken, and r. vermeulen 15 of 27A higher value for each constraint indicates that the constraint is more prevalent.
Demand and supply variables have a quarterly frequency, but have been annualized
using an arithmetic average, and cover the period 1985 to 2004 for all countries
of our sample, except Austria and Finland for which no data were available.
19
Demand and supply variables are presented in Fig. 1.
From Fig. 1, one sees that demand (resp. supply) constraints typically follow
the cycle in a counter-cyclical (resp. procyclical) way. That is, a negative output
gap should be associated with a high incidence of demand constraints together
with a low incidence of supply constraints, and a positive output gap induces
the opposite case.
20 However, the correlation with the output gap is not very
high, which indicates that demand and supply constraints contain different infor-
mation than the output gap. We note that survey questions yield somewhat













































































































































































































































































Fig. 1 Demand and supply indicators
..........................................................................................................................................................................
19The data on Austria starts only in 1996:Q1 and on Finland in 1995:Q4. Portugal and Spain are
included, although data are missing for 1985 and 1986.
20Candelon et al. (2008) showed that fixed effect estimation of the output gap on demand and supply
constraints yields results with the expected signs. It was also shown that correlations between the
constraints and the output gap exist for individual countries, which of course have the expected signs
as well.
16 of 27 fiscal and monetary integrationafter all (Candelon et al., 2008). But more importantly, changes in demand and
supply constraints give an indication of the intensity of demand and supply
shocks that are much harder to observe from changes in the output gap. We elab-
orate on this when discussing the estimation results in Table 6 below.
Another observation from Fig. 1 is that there is a difference in the shares
of firms reporting demand and supply constraints over countries. For instance,
in Germany, on average 40% of the firms indicate having demand constraints,
while only 5% on average reports supply constraints. In France, the corresponding
shares are 25% and 30%, respectively. Different reporting behaviour across
countries will, however, not affect our estimation results, since they are captured
by the fixed effects.
Finally, inspection of Fig. 1 indicates to us that supply and demand variables
are significantly inversely correlated.
The (discretionary or non-discretionary) fiscal rule can be expressed in terms
of demand (Dt) and supply (St) constraints, instead of the output gap variable
(gapt). That is, instead of using a
 ,X






1S :Et 1ðSi,tÞ   X ¼ BM;AM ð6Þ
Since a demand constraint should be associated with a negative output gap,
and a supply constraint should be associated with a positive output gap, one




1S , and an opposite sign for a
 ,X
1D .
A similar reasoning is applied to a
c,X






The estimation results are presented for discretionary and non-discretionary
policies in panel A of Tables 6 and 7. To allow for a fair comparison with
previous results, we present in the first line of both tables the results of estimating
the output gap (gapt).
Comparing Table 6 with Table 2 shows that omitting Austria and Finland
results in an increase in the estimated impact of the output gap on discretionary
policy for the post-Maastricht period. Since the shorter sample period, starting
in 1985 instead of 1980, can hardly be held responsible for differences in the
post-Maastricht results, the smaller sample of countries should be held responsible.
However, the results for the non-discretionary policy barely change when omitting
Austria and Finland, as can be seen from Tables 3 and 7. These observations
emphasize the heterogeneity of country reactions in the case of discretionary
policy, which we also found in the previous section.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
21The category ‘no constraint’, which makes up for the full 100% of the output gap, is a default and is
included in the constant term. This allows us to ignore the large differences in reported ‘no constraints’
over countries; the category ‘other’ is negligibly small. Kostoris Padoa Schioppa (2006) overcame this
problem by looking at the ratio Dt/St, but this ratio shows a highly volatile pattern, since Dt and St
usually move in opposite directions.























Output gap 0.233*** 0.192** 0.228*** 0.364***
(0.083) (0.079) 0.734 0.253 (0.075) (0.074) 0.195
Panel A: Demand and supply in (4) with election dummies—see (6)
Demand  0.033  0.013 0.006 0.001
(0.029) (0.033) 0.292 0.498 (0.039) (0.054) 0.941
Supply 0.027 0.064 0.096 0.223**
(0.060) (0.080) 0.581 0.498 (0.092) (0.107) 0.367
Panel B: Either demand or supply in (4) with election dummies—see (6)
Demand  0.044*  0.028*  0.027  0.101***
(0.023) (0.015) 0.373 0.437 (0.019) (0.033) 0.052
Supply 0.066 0.098** 0.077 0.221***
(0.047) (0.046) 0.619 0.463 (0.049) (0.065) 0.079
Panel C: Upswing and downswing gap in (4) with election dummies—see (6)
Gap_up 0.339*** 0.115 0.282*** 0.290***
(0.098) (0.087) 0.139 0.231 (0.098) (0.092) 0.952
Gap_down  0.076 0.246 0.280 0.450***
(0.375) (0.171) 0.483 0.231 (0.231) (0.091) 0.499
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Output gap  0.343***  0.495***  0.301***  0.521***
(0.031) (0.039) 0.000 0.117 (0.048) (0.023) 0.000
Panel A: Demand and supply in (5) with election dummies—see (6)
Demand 0.010 0.016 0.030 0.095**
(0.016) (0.018) 0.818 0.276 (0.020) (0.038) 0.127
Supply  0.101  0.187** 0.005  0.166**
(0.063) (0.079) 0.009 0.276 (0.050) (0.074) 0.058
Panel B: Either demand or supply in (5) with election dummies—see (6)
Demand 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.029* 0.176***
(0.012) (0.010) 0.696 0.000 (0.016) (0.029) 0.000
Supply  0.127  0.203**  0.063  0.327***
(0.079) (0.082) 0.015 0.479 (0.038) (0.049) 0.000
Panel C: Upswing and downswing gap in (5) with election dummies
Gap_up  0.276***  0.525***  0.441***  0.453***
(0.069) (0.043) 0.002 0.018 (0.124) (0.071) 0.937
Gap_down  0.166***  0.476***  0.215***  0.568***
(0.062) (0.045) 0.000 0.018 (0.079) (0.057) 0.000
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See also the note to Table 1. See also eq. (6).
18 of 27 fiscal and monetary integrationLooking first at the case of discretionary policy, the estimation results in
panel A of Table 6 indicate that using GMM and IV one consistently finds that
discretionary policy does not seem to react to supply and demand constraints.
No significant impact is found; only a significant result for supply constraints
can be observed in case of IV after Maastricht. However, we already concluded
from our inspection of Fig. 1 that supply and demand constraints are
strongly correlated, hence estimating an equation containing both of them will
probably lead to a multicollinearity bias. We therefore also estimate eqs (3) and
(4) separately with the demand and the supply constraint alone. These results
are presented in panel B of both tables.
From panel B of Table 6, one sees that the impact of both demand and
supply constraints, when estimated separately, is significant according to the
IV-estimations after Maastricht. These results are also found, albeit less significant,
when using the GMM estimators. The observed pro-cyclical reaction of discretion-
ary fiscal policy to demand constraints implies a fiscal contraction when facing
these constraints. In addition, the IV results show a highly significant procyclical
impact of supply constraints after Maastricht. One also sees that in the period after
Maastricht, supply constraints have a much stronger impact than demand con-
straints. This indicates an asymmetric reaction to demand and supply shocks.
To elaborate the latter point, we have also estimated eq. (3) while distinguishing
between two values for the output gap, one during the upswing and one during
the downswing; see also Fonseca Marinheira (2005).
22 When interpreting these
results, one should realize that the number of non-zero observations for both
variables is relatively small in the pre-Maastricht period, which makes the results
less reliable. However, from Panel C in Table 6 one can see that the IV estimation
results are highly significant. The gap variable has a much stronger impact during
a downswing, reinforcing the conclusion of asymmetry. Surprisingly, such a sig-
nificant impact is not found from the GMM estimator, nor is the asymmetry.
In particular, the IV-estimations are consistent with Fonseca Marinheira (2005),
who found an asymmetric impact of procyclical policy and concluded: ‘Thus,
in general, discretionary fiscal policy is procyclical in upswings and counter-cyclical
in downswings’ (p.9).
When comparing the results in panel C with those of panel B, we find that both
estimations, when significant, indicate asymmetries after Maastricht in the reaction
to demand and supply constraints, or upswings and downswings. The reaction to
supply constraints or downswings is stronger. An interesting feature is that one
should realise that both demand and supply constraints react to downswings (and
upswings).
23 During a downswing, supply constraints will become stronger and
..........................................................................................................................................................................
22An alternative found in the literature is to distinguish between a positive and a negative output gap.
However, as Candelon et al. (2008) showed, this yields poor estimation results.
23The fixed effects estimation of the output gap on demand and supply constraints shows no stronger
impact of the supply constraints on the output gap compared to the impact of demand constraints.
b. candelon, j. muysken, and r. vermeulen 19 of 27demand constraints less strong. Therefore, the asymmetric impact of demand
and supply constraints provides additional information on the asymmetric
impact of upswings and downswings. We leave this as a matter for further research,
but conclude that including demand and supply constraints in the analysis
yields significant estimation results and interesting additional information.
Turning to non-discretionary policy, panel A in Table 7 shows that the impact
of supply constraints is consistently negative whenever significant. Also, both
GMM and IV indicate that supply constraints have a significantly stronger
impact after Maastricht. However, the impact of demand constraints is less clear;
the IV-estimation results are consistent with predictions, i.e., it has a positive
impact, whereas GMM yields insignificant results.
When estimating the effects separately, panel B of Table 7 shows that in the
case of non-discretionary policy, all results are consistent with expectations; the
impact of demand and supply constraints is consistently positive and negative,
respectively, for both GMM and IV. In both panels A and B, the supply constraints
have a significantly stronger impact after Maastricht, both compared to the
pre-Maastricht period and compared to the impact of demand constraints. This
is a similar asymmetry as found with the discretionary budget policy. Interestingly,
this asymmetry is not found when we estimate the impact of the output gap
when distinguishing between upswings and downswings, as can be seen from
panel C of Table 7. That is, we observe a stronger impact of the automatic stabilizer
after Maastricht, as also appears from the first line of Table 7. However, the output
gap does not have a stronger impact during downswings, contrary to what
we found for the case of discretionary policy. We include a further analysis
of these results in our agenda for further research, and turn to the quest of country
heterogeneity, which was the original motivation for the analysis of the impact
of demand and supply constraints.
When considering country heterogeneity in discretionary policy we distinguish
again between large and small countries, as in Section 3. First we show, in Panel A
of Tables 8 and 9, that ignoring the outliers – in this case Greece and Portugal –
does not significantly affect the estimation results.
When focussing on large countries—cf. panel B of Tables 8 and 9—both demand
and supply constraints are significant after Maastricht in the IV-estimations.
In addition, the results indicate a significant decrease in the impact of demand
constraints compared to the period before Maastricht, and they further indicate
a significant increase in the impact of supply constraints. In particular, for the
supply constraints the pattern is much clearer for large countries than for all
countries taken together. Moreover, the asymmetry in the reaction to demand
and supply constraints is slightly weaker for the large countries than for the
total sample.
The results for small countries show no clear pattern. All results indicate no
significant reaction to both demand and supply constraints, neither before nor
after Maastricht.
20 of 27 fiscal and monetary integrationTable 8 Discretionary fiscal rule, 1985–2004, demand constraints
GMM
..........................................................................




















Panel A: EMU-9 and outliers with election dummies
EMU-9  0.044*  0.028*  0.027  0.101***
(0.023) (0.015) 0.373 0.437 (0.019) (0.033) 0.052
EMU-9 (excl.
GRC&PRT)
 0.039**  0.022**  0.022  0.097**
(0.018) (0.011) 0.179 0.500 (0.017) (0.036) 0.125
Panel B: large vs small countries with election dummies
DEU/ESP/
FRA/ITA
 0.025***  0.008  0.019  0.140*
(0.005) (0.014) 0.043 0.534 (0.020) (0.070) 0.105
BEL/IRE/NLD  0.002 0.005  0.022 0.017
(0.013) (0.016) 0.392 0.217 (0.038) (0.086) 0.683













i,t 1 þ a
 ,AM
2 :d 
i,t 1 þ a
 ,BM
3 :bi,t 1 þ a
 ,AM
3 :bi,t 1 þ ui,t, including election
dummies. See also the note to Table 1. For the GMM specification BEL/IRE/NLD, the lagged US
gap is excluded from the instrument space. The output gap is instrumented in the IV estimator
by including the one-year lagged US output gap.
Table 9 Discretionary fiscal rule, 1985–2004, supply constraints
GMM
........................................................................




















Panel A: EMU-9 and outliers with election dummies
EMU-9 0.066 0.098** 0.077 0.221***
(0.047) (0.046) 0.619 0.463 (0.049) (0.065) 0.079
EMU-9 (excl.
GRC&PRT)
0.047 0.070 0.052 0.218***
(0.033) (0.063) 0.714 0.310 (0.036) (0.072) 0.041
Panel B: large vs small countries with election dummies
DEU/ESP/
FRA/ITA
0.004 0.088* 0.043 0.210***
(0.018) (0.044) 0.006 0.414 (0.029) (0.076) 0.044
BEL/IRE/NLD 0.240  0.110  0.005 0.099
(0.180) (0.129) 0.028 0.532 (0.254) (0.200) 0.751
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is excluded from the instrument space. The output gap is instrumented in the IV estimator by including
the one-year lagged US output gap.
b. candelon, j. muysken, and r. vermeulen 21 of 27The decomposition of the output gap in the demand and supply constraints
illuminates that in general, the EMU-9 countries have reacted in an asymmetric
way to demand and supply shocks. The estimation results indicate that non-
discretionary policy was more focused on reducing the deficit after Maastricht;
the counter-cyclical reaction to supply constraints was stronger, both compared
to the pre-Maastricht period and compared to the impact of demand constraints.
Similar results were found for the procyclical discretionary policy. Again, supply
constraints were found to have a much stronger impact than demand constraints
in the period after Maastricht.
These results also shed more light on country heterogeneity in discretionary
policy. Consistent with the results from the previous section, we find that procy-
clical discretionary policy is mainly present in large countries, and the results of
this section show that procyclical policy is strongest during upswings, when supply
constraints are more binding. The absence of reaction to these constraints in
small countries, in contrast to large countries, is consistent with the prediction
of Kostoris Padoa Schioppa (2006).
5. Conclusion
In evaluating the impact of the Maastricht Treaty on fiscal policy in the EMU
countries, Galı ´ and Perotti (2003) found that the automatic stabilizers were more
effective in counter-cyclical stabilization after the implementation of the Treaty,
while the procyclical stance of discretionary fiscal policy before Maastricht turned
to an acyclical stance thereafter. From these findings, Galı ´ and Perotti concluded
that the fiscal rules implied by Maastricht (and by the Stability and Growth Pact)
do not imply an unnecessary and harmful straight jacket for fiscal policy in the
EMU countries.
Using an extended sample size and revised data, this paper casts some doubt
on this optimistic finding of Galı ´ and Perotti. We show that the procyclical behav-
iour of the discretionary fiscal policy has not disappeared with the Maastricht
Treaty, but instead it persisted and was even amplified in recent years. Such a
result stresses that the fiscal arrangements that followed the Maastricht Treaty
indeed tied the hands of European governments in their implementation of
stabilizing discretionary fiscal policy. In order to avoid excessive deficits due
to the working of the automatic stabilizer in reaction to large supply shocks,
governments followed a procyclical discretionary policy.
This conclusion corroborates the result of Fata ´s and Mihov (2003a), who attrib-
uted the procyclical discretionary policy to a ‘fatigue effect’. They illustrated this
by presenting two trends over the period 1991–2001. In their Fig. 4, they portrayed
the average absolute value of change in the cyclically adjusted budget positions
of the Euro countries. The decline of this value over the period 1991–9 indicates
‘...a trend towards smaller changes in discretionary policy. ...[However], since
1999, this measure of discretionary fiscal policy is picking up again. In other
words, in 2000 and 2001 governments deviated more from their cyclically adjusted
22 of 27 fiscal and monetary integrationbudget positions than in previous years’ (p.122); this is indicative of the fatigue
effect: ‘Once countries have moved into the safe area below the 3% limit, the
pressure to continue towards the goal of close to balance or surplus is much
weaker and it shows in the data’ (p.121).
Similar observations were made by Fata ´s and Mihov (2003a) from their Fig. 8,
in which they presented the standard deviation of change in the cyclically adjusted
budget positions of the Euro countries. They found that the dispersion after
a decreasing trend until 1999 also has higher values in 2000 and 2001.
We reproduce the first series for our sample over the period 1980–2006
in Fig. 2.
24 The decline Fata ´s and Mihov (2003a) reported for the 1990s is also
clearly visible in our data. However, this decline starts in the 1980s, as can be
seen from our data, which contradicts Fata ´s and Mihov’s focus on the 1990s
and the Maastricht Treaty. In Fig. 3 we show the average change in discretionary
deficit and Eurozone output gap. The figure illustrates that discretionary budget
deficits fluctuate in a procyclical way, as we also find consistently in our earlier
analysis. A distinct feature is the impact of the downturns around 1982, 1992,
and 2004, which all decrease the discretionary deficit; during upswings, when
the business cycle picks up again, the discretionary deficit increases. The latter
observation also illustrates that the interpretation by Fata ´s and Mihov (2003a)
of the increased deviation in discretionary budget positions in 2000 and 2001
is not due to a fatigue effect, but rather to the procyclical nature of discretionary
policy.
The divergence in fluctuations between the series shown in Figs 2 and 3 indicates



















Fig. 2 Average absolute value of change in cyclically adjusted budget positions
..........................................................................................................................................................................
24One should realize that Fata ´s and Mihov (2003a) used a different method to identify discretionary
deficits than the OECD, based on the estimated residual of a government spending equation—see Fata ´s
and Mihov (2003b).
b. candelon, j. muysken, and r. vermeulen 23 of 27fluctuations in the standard deviation portrayed in Fig. 8 of Fata ´s and Mihov,
2003a). This observation clearly illustrates the country heterogeneity we report
above; the larger spread between the average absolute values and the average
values themselves during recessions illustrates the different reactions of large and
small member states.
We show in Section 3 above that large countries have conducted stronger
procyclical discretionary fiscal policy than small countries after the Maastricht
Treaty, whereas their fiscal behaviour was similarly procyclical before the Treaty.
These observations are confirmed by a strong positive reaction to supply con-
straints and a negative response to demand constraints for large countries after
the Maastricht Treaty. In contrast, small countries showed no reaction. Since
the reaction to supply constraints is stronger than to demand constraints, we
observe an increasing discretionary deficit during the upswing, which confirms
the finding of a procyclical discretionary fiscal reaction to the output gap. Note
that the asymmetry in fiscal policy conduct is only present for the discretionary
deficit. The automatic stabilizers work in a virtually identical manner in both
large and small countries.
The economic stance appears as a key factor for the characterization of
fiscal policy. In a recent paper, Manasse (2005) distinguished between ‘very
good’ and ‘very bad’ economic times and ‘intermediate states’. He then derived
a simple model where limits on deficit output ratios lead to procyclical
policies only in intermediate states, and to countercyclical policies in the
other cases. Empirical investigations are now necessary to assess this idea, and
these will constitute a promising area of future research. It will nevertheless
be necessary to overcome some technical problems, in particular those associated































Average value of change cyclically adjusted budget (left axis) Output gap (right axis)
Fig. 3 Average value of change in cyclically adjusted budget deficits and the
Eurozone output gap
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Appendix: data description
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 79 (June 2006)
(i) Primary government balance, cyclically adjusted
(ii) Primary government balance
(iii) Output gap
(iv) Gross government debt
Note that for Germany until 1990, the series for West-Germany was used and from
1991 onwards, data for Germany was used.
Data is available from 1979–2007, but for some countries the data is extended
backward:
(i) Primary government balance—Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain (1979)
26 of 27 fiscal and monetary integration(ii) Gross government debt—Ireland (1979–97), Italy (1979–94), Portugal
(1979–94), and Spain (1979–89)
We extend gross government debt (d) using a linear transformation based on
the ratio of old data to new for the first three years for which both are available.






Tþ2, where T is
the first year where both debt figures are available. The data is extended back
for t={1979,...,T 1} by multiplying the old debt figures with the respective
ratio (dold 
t Rd). The ‘old’ data are the data used by Galı ´ and Perotti (2003).
Primary government balance is estimated in a similar fashion for the single
year 1979.
The cyclical part of the deficit is calculated by converting the primary govern-
ment balance as a percentage of potential GDP by: Primary government
balance*(100-output gap)/100 and subtracting the cyclically adjusted primary
government balance from it. The differences are relatively small.
A detailed description of the data can be found in the OECD’s Economic
Outlook Database Inventory: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/59/37380381.pdf
(EO79 August 2006 version).
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